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ABSTRACT 
Enterprises in a tourism supply chain (TSC) often optimize their businesses by adopting 
and operating profit or revenue maximization strategies. This paper investigates the conditions 
under which these strategies are preferred. We consider a TSC consisting of three sectors: a 
theme park operator, tour operators and accommodation providers. Simultaneous 
non-cooperative games are used as decision models of individual enterprises within the same 
sector while a two-stage sequential game is used to coordinate tourist quantities between the 
three sectors that form the two layers of the TSC. The theme park determines the admission price, 
while the accommodation sector achieves market clearing prices through quantity competition. 
After learning the decisions of the theme park and the accommodation sector, the tour operator 
sector decides final price of package holiday through quantity competition. Several observations 
are derived from equilibrium solutions. First, tour operators and accommodation providers that 
select the revenue maximization strategy obtain larger market shares and profits than those that 
select the profit maximization strategy, while the theme park operator generally prefers 
enterprises in the other two sectors to select the revenue maximization strategy. Second, the 
profit maximization strategy is a better choice when all enterprises in each of the sectors choose 
the same strategy. Finally, if tour operators and accommodation providers are free to choose their 
own strategies, there is a market equilibrium where profit and revenue maximization strategies 
could coexist. 
Keywords: tourism supply chain; package holidays; game theory; profit maximization; 
revenue maximization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Tourism industry has enjoyed rapid developments in recent years. This is particularly true for the 
emerging economies such as China including Hong Kong and Macau. Inbound tourists from 
mainland China are particularly interested in package tours consisting of core components such 
as theme park, tourist sites, and shopping experiences. A complex supply chain has developed in 
Hong Kong tourism and hospitality industries. Travel agents and tour operators compete with 
each other on the one hand, and coordinate between various service providers on the other hand, 
during the process of configuring most suitable package holidays. A tourism supply chain (TSC) 
typically comprises the suppliers of all the goods and services that go into the delivery of tourism 
products to consumers (Tapper and Font 2007). Enterprises in a tourism supply chain (TSC) 
often optimize their businesses by adopting and operating profit or revenue maximization 
strategies. A question is under what conditions a specific strategy is preferred.  
The literature on firm behavior in the mainstream economics is rich. Perhaps the most 
important assumption is that an enterprise is to maximize profits strategically according to 
Hirshleifer (1980). However, this pure profit maximizing strategy has been criticized by Baumol 
(1967) and Nicholson (1995). They argue that an enterprise may maximize sales as a long-term 
survival strategy. Enterprises in Tourism and Hospitality industry have also practiced different 
strategies of maximizing profits and/or revenues (Collins and Parsa 2006). A profit-maximizing 
tourism enterprise may compete in a mature market, has a stable market share, and at the same 
time is popular with tourists. Such a profit-maximizing decision is normally influenced by 
shareholders who expect steady increases in profits. With an increasing demand for tourism in 
many destinations, tourism enterprises also adopt the revenue-maximization strategy to increase 
market shares through introducing new products/services. Furthermore, while 
shareholders/owners of large tourism enterprises are generally more interested in profitability, 
the managers of these tourism enterprises are more concerned with revenue growth and prestige, 
which depend very much on the expansion of their businesses than profit (Yakov and Jacob, 
1979). Generally speaking, tourism enterprises may adopt both profit maximization and revenue 
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maximization strategies, but only one needs to dominate at a specific operational stage. For 
example, a firm could adopt a revenue-maximizing strategy subject to a minimum profit 
constraint.  
This paper aims to investigate strategy choices of enterprises in TSC for package holidays. 
We consider a TSC with two layers or echelons structure. In the upstream layer, there are 
multiple accommodation providers and a theme park. They provide services for the downstream 
TSC. A number of tour operators at the downstream layer are responsible for configuring and 
packaging holiday products, then sell them to targeted tourists. The prices of package holidays 
consist of the payment for accommodation and the admission charges to the theme park. In order 
to simplify the game-theoretic model for the analysis, other sectors such as transport are not 
included in this study. They can be considered in a similar way in which the accommodation 
sector is considered in this study.  
This paper considers two strategies: profit maximizing strategy and revenues maximizing 
strategy. Each tour operator or accommodation provider within the TSC is assumed to make its 
own strategy choice freely. In the chosen TSC, it is assumed that a monopoly theme park 
operator dominates the industry. This dominant theme park is able to exert a significant degree of 
control over the price and gain steady profit. There is no need for this theme park to compete for 
the market share. Its market size is directly affected by its pricing strategy. Therefore, this theme 
park can be considered as a profit-maximizer. We are interested in the following questions: 
(1)  What impacts would the strategies of maximizing profits and revenues have on tour 
operators, accommodation providers and the theme pack operator, respectively?  
(2)  What is the most beneficial strategy for individual enterprises, the sectors, and the entire 
TSC and what are the conditions associated with such a strategy?  
(3)  Could individual enterprises practice different strategies in the same supply chain and what 
are the conditions for such co-existence?  
In order to address these research questions, this paper proposes a two-stage game 
framework. The theme park operator determines its admission fees. Meanwhile, accommodation 
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providers compete with each other within the same sector, and determine the market equilibrium 
price through quantity competition. Informed with the prices from the upstream businesses, tour 
operators decide their strategies. The equilibrium price for package holidays are then reached 
also through quantity competition. The two-stage game is solved in a bottom-up fashion, i.e. 
backward induction. Given the demand faced by the tour operators, each of them simultaneously 
determines the number of tourists they would like to attract in order to maximize its profit or 
revenues. Aggregating the equilibrium quantities of tourists for all tour operators gives the best 
response functions (demand curves) for accommodation providers and the theme park operator. 
Following the same procedure for the accommodation sector, and combining the result from the 
theme park, the overall equilibriums can solved for the TSC under consideration. 
Although game theory has been widely used in studying manufacturing supply chain 
problems, it has rarely been used in tourism with only a few exceptions. Taylor (1998) introduces 
a game matrix and analyzed a tour operator’s mixed price strategy; Chung (2000) examines the 
pricing strategy and business performance of super deluxe hotels in Seoul by modifying the 
prisoner’s dilemma game model. Wie (2003) formulates a dynamic game model of strategic 
capacity investment in cruise line industry. Bastakis, Buhalis, and Butler (2004) present a 
bargaining game with asymmetric information to analyze relationships between tour operators 
and small-medium sized tourism accommodation enterprises. Recently, Garcia and Tugores 
(2006) propose a two-stage duopoly game model in which hotels competed in both quality and 
prices. These references mainly focus on single tourism sectors. In contrast, our study focuses on 
three sectors organized in two echelons. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the 
equilibrium solution. Section 3 discusses the strategy choices of enterprises in TSC in different 
situations. Section 4 presents a number of useful managerial implications derived from the 
numerical examples. General conclusions are given in Section 5. Proofs of theorems with more 
mathematical details are provided in Appendices due to space constraints. 
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METHOD 
The TSC for package holidays includes three sectors, namely the tour operators (TOs), 
accommodation providers (HAs), and a theme park operator (TP). There is only one TP while 
multiple TOs and HAs are involved in the TSC. TP provides key activities for tourists to visit, 
and HAs supply accommodation for tourists. TOs are responsible for packaging the holidays 
together for tourists with options from the services provided by the TP and HAs. For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that all tourists will visit the TP when they join the package holidays. This 
means that tourists do not obtain tickets directly from the TP operator. Those who obtain tickets 
directly from the TP operator do not require hotel accommodation and therefore are not included 
for consideration in our model. TOs and HAs are grouped into sectors. The two-echelon structure 
can be represented as a tree with each sector represented by a node (see figure 1).  
Theme
Park
Operator
Tour 
Operators
TSC
Accommodation
providers
Profit maximization enterprise
Revenue maximization enterprise
Tourism sector  
Figure 1. The Tourism Supply Chain  
Each TO/HA in this TSC has two strategies: profit maximizing strategy (P-strategy) and 
revenues maximizing strategy (R-strategy). Enterprises in the TSC are assumed to play a 
two-stage sequential game: 
Stage 1: TP first decides the admission price, and each HA determines its operation strategy and 
optimal service quantities according to the strategy selected. 
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Stage 2: After observing the strategies adopted by TP and HAs, then each TO determines its 
operation strategy and quantities of package holidays through competition. 
The quantity competition between enterprise within a sector such as the accommodation 
sector or the tour operator sector is modeled as a simultaneous non-cooperative game often 
called Cournot game. In such a game, each enterprise aims to maximize profits, based on the 
expectation that its own output decision will not have an effect on the decisions of its rivals. 
Enterprises do not cooperate and choose production quantities independently and simultaneously. 
Price is negatively related to the total output, as suggested by standard economic theory. 
In the mathematical formulation, there are N TOs and M HAs in the TSC, indexed by 
 and1...i = N 1...j M=
RTO
. The subscript (P and R) is used to distinguish the entities in the TSC 
using different operation strategies. For example,  is the TOs that adopt the R-strategy,  
is the number of s and 
RTO RN
R
R
Nn
N
=  is the market ratio in the TO sector. The strategy sets of 
TOs and HAs are denoted by ( , )i iX X X −=  and ( , )j jY Y Y−=  in space {  and{, }NP R , }MP R  
respectively, where , . 1...i N= 1...j M i= X −  and jY−  represent strategy sets of TOs and HAs 
excluding  and . Unit cost of TP, HA, and TO are c,  and , while price of TP, HA, 
and TO are p,
iTO HA
2
j 2c 1c
p  and 1p . Without loss of generality, we assume a linear inverse price function 
for , that is,jTO 1
jp Qα β= − , where Q  is the total number of tourists. The linear price 
function is broadly used in the manufacturing supply chain studies (Carr and Karmarkar 2005; 
Xiao and Yu 2006) as well as in tourism and hospitality literature (Zheng 1997; Wie 2005). The 
parameter α  presents the market size and 1 2cc cα > + + . β  is quantity-sensitivity and this 
means that an increase in tourist quantities will lead to decrease in price in a competitive 
environment. 
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The Model for TOs 
The profit function of  isiTO 1 1 1 2 1(
i i i iq p p p cπ )= − − − , and the revenue function of  
is
iTO
1 1 1 2( )
i i iR q p p p= − −
1
iq
, where  is the unit cost of . Taking the first and second derivatives 
with respect to , we get the optimal quantities: 
1
ic iTO
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2 2
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β
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β
≠
≠
⎧ − − − − ∈⎪⎪= ⎨ − −⎪ − ∈⎪⎩
∑
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Sum up quantities for all TOs, the total number of tourists that all TOs service can be 
expressed as: 
2 1( )
( 1)
P Pp p n c NQ
N
α
β
− − −= + , where 
1
1
P
i
i TO
P
P
c
c
N
∈= ∑                       (1) 
The Model for HAs 
From equation (1), a demand curve for HAs is 2 2 1
( 1
P
Q Np p n c
N
)βα += − − − . Applying 
the same logic as for TOs, the profit function and the revenue function for  are 
 and  respectively, where  is unit cost of . If following 
quantities are decided, HAs have no incentive to deviate those selections. 
jHA
2 2 2 2( )
j j jq p cπ = − 2 2j jq pπ = 2 2jc jHA
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Sum up quantities for all the HAs, the total number of tourist of HAs is 
1 2( )
( 1)( 1)
P P P PMN p n c m cQ
M N
α
β
− − −= + + , where 
2
2
P
j
j HA
P
p
c
c
M
∈= ∑                  (2) 
The Model for TP 
From equation (1), the TP’s admission price is 2 1
( 1
P P
Q Np p n c
N
)βα += − − − . Assuming 
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the TP maximizes its profit 3 (Q p c)π = − , the optimal number of visitors to TP is: 
2 1( )c
2 ( 1)
P PN p n cQ
N
α
β
− −= +
−                                           (3) 
Model Equilibriums 
Combining (2) and (3), the following equilibrium solutions can be obtained: 
for TP:     1 2( )
(2 1)( 1)
P P P PNM m cc n c
M N
;
2 2
1 2
3 2
( )
(2 1) ( 1)
P P P PM N c n c m c
M N
απ β
− − −= + + . 
α
β
− − −= + +Q
for Pi TO∈ : 1 1
i
P Pn c cQ
N β
−= + ,
2
2 1 1
1 1 1
( )2( ) ( )
i
iP i P P
P P
n c cQ Q n c c
N N
π β β
−= + − + . 1iPq
for : Ri TO∈ 11iR P Pn cQq N β= + ,
2 1
1 1 1( ) (2 ) ( )
iR i iP P
P P P P
n cQ Q n c c n c c
N N
π β β 1 1= + − + − . 
for Pj HA∈ : 2 22 ( )( 1)
j
jP P PN m c cQq
M Nβ
−= + + , 
2
2 2 2
2 2 2
( )( 1) 2( ) ( )
( 1)
j
jP j P P
P P
N m c cN Q Q m c c
N M M N
βπ β
−+= + − + + . 
for Rj HA∈ : 22 ( 1
jR
)
P PNm cQq
M Nβ= + + , 
2 2
2 2 2
( 1) ( ) (2 ) (
( 1)
jR j jP P
P P P P
Nm cN Q Q m c c m c c
N M M N 2 2
)βπ β
+= + − + + −
*
. 
The following definition is used throughout the rest of the paper. 
DEFINITION 1. Given other HAs’ (TOs’) strategies, if * *1 1( , ) ( , )i i i i i iX X Xπ π X− −≤  
(  for * *2 2( , ) ( , )j j j j j jY Y Y Yπ π− −≤ * 1...i N∀ =  ( 1...j M∀ = ), then * *( , )i iX X − * *( , )j jY Y−  is 
the TO (HA) Nash Equilibrium, and *Pn  (
*
Pm ) is the equilibrium market ratio 
(EMR). 
This definition means that if a TO or HA is in the Nash equilibrium, it has no incentive to 
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unilaterally change its strategy. In other words, the equilibrium strategy is its optimal choice 
given others’ strategies. Any changes would reduce profits. For simplicity, we assume that all 
TOs or HAs are identical in the following discussions. 
FINDINGS 
Based on the above equilibriums, we first identify the impact of different strategy choices on the 
performance of TOs, HAs and the TP. The results are presented below: 
PROPOSITION 1. (1) Output shares and profits for TOs or HAs that choose 
R-strategy are greater than those that adopt the P-strategy; (2) TP benefits from the 
R-strategy adopted by the TOs and HAs. 
Let us consider a simple scenario where all enterprises in the same sector use the same 
strategy. That is, all the TOs and HAs formed strategic alliances in their respective sectors, so 
that their decisions are consistently coordinated. Four possibilities are considered here. (1) all 
TOs and HAs choose the P-strategy; (2) all TOs choose the P-strategy and all HAs choose the 
R-strategy; (3) all TOs choose the R-strategy and all HAs choose the P-strategy; (4) all the TOs 
and HAs choose the R-strategy. The profits of TOs or HAs under these four considerations can 
be easily derived based on the results from the previous section. They are listed in the game 
matrix shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 Game Matrix 
HA  
P-Strategy R-Strategy  
P-Strategy ( 1
PPπ , 2PPπ ) ( 1PRπ , 2PRπ ) 
TO 
R-Strategy ( 1
RPπ , 2RPπ ) ( 1RRπ , 2RRπ ) 
 
where  
2 2
1 2
1 2 2
( )
(2 1) ( 1)
PP M c c c
M N
απ β
− − −= + + ;
2
1 2
2 2
( )
(2 1) ( 1)
PP N c c c
M N
απ β
− − −= + + ; 
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2 2
1 1
( ) ( )[ ]
(2 1)( 1) (2 1)( 1)
RP M c c M c cc
M N M N
α απ β
− − − −= −+ + + + ;
2
2
2 2
( )
(2 1) ( 1)
RP N c c
M N
απ β
− −= + + ; 
2 2
1
1 2 2
( )
(2 1) ( 1)
PR M c c
M N
απ β
− −= + + ;
1 1
2 2
( )( )
2 1 (2 1)( 1
PR c c N c cc
M M )N
α απ β
− − −= − −+ + + ; 
1 1
( ) ( )[ ]
(2 1)( 1) (2 1)( 1)
RR M c M cc
M N M N
α απ β
− −= −+ + + + ; 2 2
( )( )
2 1 (2 1)( 1
RR c N cc
M M )N
α απ β
− −= −+ + + . 
 
LEMMA 1. 1 1 1
PR RR RPπ π π> > , 1 1 1PR PP RPπ π π> > , 2 2 2RP RR PRπ π π> > , 2 2 2RP PP PRπ π π> > . 
THEOREM 1. The unique Nash Equilibrium of the above game matrix exists when 
all TOs and HAs choose the P-strategy. 
Next, we investigate a common scenario where TOs and HAs freely choose their strategies. 
The following theorem gives the sufficient and necessary condition for the Nash Equilibrium in 
the TO sector: 
THEOREM 2. The sufficient and necessary condition for * *( ,i i )X X −  to be in the 
Nash Equilibrium in the TO sector is when EMR *Pn  satisfies ,  
* [ ,P Pn n∈ ] [0,1]Pn− + I
where 
2
11 ( 2 2 ) (1 )
P P
pn k N N k c k
( )1 1 c m c kk α− = + −− − + −
− −− , 
2
1
( )1 ( 1 )
1 ( 2 2 ) (1 )
P P
p
c m c kN kn
k N N k c k
α+ − −− += + −− − + − , and (2 1)( 1)
Mk
M N
= + + . 
Similar to Theorem 2, a new theorem for the HA sector could be derived: 
THEOREM 3. The sufficient and necessary condition for  to be in the 
Nash Equilibrium in the HA sector is when EMR 
* *( , )j jY Y−
*
Pm  satisfies 
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* [ , ] [0,1P P Pm m m
− +∈ I ] ,  
where 
1
2
1 21
2 (2 3) 2
P P
p
c n cm
M M M Mc
α− − −= + + −−  
1
2
1 2 11
2 (2 3) 2
P P
p
c n cMm
M M M Mc
α+ − −−= + + −− . 
The numbers of enterprises included in the TO sector and HA sector are often large. For 
example, a large number of tour operators in mainland China run tour business to a theme park in 
Hong Kong, and there are plenty of hotels serving tourists in Hong Kong. Under this condition, 
we can get the following corollary: 
COROLLARY 1. All the TOs and HAs choose P-strategy when conditions  
and  are hold. 
N →∞
M →∞
This corollary is intuitive: as [ , ]P Pm m
− +  and [ , ]P Pn n
− +  converge to 1 when N and M 
become infinite. It presents the perfect competition market in which the equilibrium price is 
equal to unit cost and all TOs and HAs only earn normal profits. 
As is common in the industrial organization literature, social planers often care about the 
sector welfare or total sector surplus (Garcia and Tugores 2006). Welfare function or total sector 
surplus is defined as the sum of profits of all enterprises in the sector. 
The surplus for the TOs is: 1 1
P R
TO p RN Nπ πΠ = +  
The surplus for the Has is: 2 2
P R
HA P RM Mπ πΠ = +  
Maximizing a sector’s surplus, one can easy get the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2. P strategy is the optimal choice for the TO and HA sectors. 
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Similar to the definition of the sector welfare, the supply chain welfare or supply chain 
surplus is 3Chian TO HA πΠ = Π +Π + . The following proposition gives the optimal strategy choices 
when the supply chain welfare is maximized. 
PROPOSITION 3. In the context of the entire supply chain, the optimal strategy 
choices for TOs ( Pn ) and HAs ( Pm ) satisfy 1 2
1 2
(2 1)( 1)
2
P Pc n c m c M N
c c c MN
α
α
− − − + +=− − − . 
APPLICATION OF RESULTS 
The previous section presents the theoretical results of strategy choices in different scenarios. 
Numerical examples are presented in this section to give a better understanding of the theoretical 
findings. Managerial implications are also derived and discussed. 
Proposition 1 presents the impact of different strategies on the performance of tourism 
enterprises. Under the perfect competition condition, tourism firms that choose the R-strategy 
would serve more tourists than they adopt the P-strategy. This would also result in more than 
average profits and market shares. Additionally, we also observe from the equilibriums that an 
enterprise with higher unit cost will have a lower market share when the P-strategy is adopted. 
This is consistent with common sense that an inefficient enterprise can not perform well. Given 
our assumption that all package tourists visit the theme park, TP would be very profitable if more 
TOs/HAs choose the R-strategy. 
When all enterprises in the same sector choose the same strategy, Theorem 1 shows that 
P-strategy is the optimal for either TOs or HAs under the condition where enterprises are 
coordinated in deciding their strategies. The remaining question is whether this optimality is 
valid for the TO and HA sectors. Proposition 2 gives a positive answer to this question. That is, 
when all enterprises choose the P-strategy, all sectors would maximize their profits. 
However, tourism enterprises may behave differently under various operational situations, 
especially when the number of enterprises in the sector is large. In this case, coordination is 
impractical. We are interested in whether the Nash Equilibriums exist in the tourism supply chain 
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and under what condition if they exist. Example 1 illustrates an unbalanced market. 
EXAMPLE 1: There are 8 TOs and 5 HAs in the TSC. TOs and HAs have identical unit 
costs  and , respectively. Demand parameters 1 2c = 2 4c = α ,β  and the unit cost of TP c are 
40, 1.5 and 3, respectively. Three TOs and three HAs adopt P-strategy. Since the profit of TO/HA 
that adopt R-strategy is greater than that of TO/HA that choose P-strategy, the P-strategy 
enterprises have incentive to change their strategies. The similar question also arises in view of 
the R-strategy enterprises. The computational result shows that the TO that takes P-strategy 
would change its strategy, under the assumption that other TOs would keep their strategies 
unchanged. If this happens, this TO’s profit would increase from 0.141 to 0.329. Similar to the 
HA sector, the HA who switch from the P-strategy to the R-strategy increases its profit from 
1.293 to 2.111. It becomes clear that there is a strong incentive for TOs/HAs to change their 
strategies. 
The above example clearly shows that tourism enterprises with either the P-strategy or the 
R-strategy do not necessarily stick to the same strategies all the time. The change of strategy by a 
firm would be on the assumption that others would keep their strategy unchanged. It is unclear 
however from this example, who and how many TOs or HAs would change their strategies. 
 Theorem 2 and 3 jointly give the sufficient conditions for the Nash Equilibrium in the TO 
sector and the HA sector. This scenario is illustrated in the following example. 
EXAMPLE 2: Two TOs and HAs choose P-strategies, and other parameters are as same as 
those in Example 1. If one TO with the P-strategy changes its strategy to R-strategy, then its 
profit drops from 0.046 to 0.034 if other TOs do not change their strategies. If one TO with 
R-strategy changes its strategy to P-strategy, then its profit drops from 0.396 to 0.167. Hence, no 
TO has any incentive to change its strategy. The same result could be derived for a HA in that the 
profit of this HA would drop from 2.185 to 1.333 if it changes its R-strategy to P-strategy. The 
profit would drop from 0.354 to 0.109 if it changed its P-strategy to R-strategy. Therefore, no 
TOs/HAs would want to change their current operation strategies. This indicates that the Nash 
Equilibrium exists in the TSC.  
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Although the equilibrium exists for a particular sector rather than a single enterprise, P 
strategy is supposed to be the best strategy choice. This is clear from Proposition 2 that the 
R-strategy enterprises are likely to maximize their revenues, reduce the market prices and unit 
profits through competition. Even if their profits are larger than that of the P-strategy enterprises, 
the extra income gained could not make up the losses made by the P-strategy enterprises, which 
result in a decrease in the total sector surplus. Additionally, proposition 3 shows the condition in 
which the supply chain warfare is maximized. It is easy to observe that the P-strategy is the 
optimal strategy for both TOs and HAs if the number of enterprises is sufficiently large 
(theoretically infinite).  
CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates strategy choices by enterprises in a TSC for package holidays. The 
TSC includes multiple TOs and HAs, and a TP. Two alternative strategies are available for the 
TOs and HAs to choose and they are the profit maximizing strategy and revenues maximizing 
strategy. 
A two-stage game model is proposed to analyze the strategic choices of the enterprises in 
the TSC. The TP at the upstream of the TSC determines its admission price, while the HAs 
determine their operational strategies and the equilibrium price is reached through quantity 
competition. Given the price decisions from the upstream, TOs choose their strategies and select 
their optimal tourist quantities. The game has been solved by backward induction. The TOs first 
determine the optimal number of tourists they served according to their strategies. The prices 
derived from the TO sector are used by HAs and TP to make their decisions, respectively. Using 
the same logic for HAs , and combining the result from TP sector, the overall equilibriums are 
solved for the TSC. 
Several managerial implications are derived from this theoretical research. Firstly, TOs and 
HAs that select the R-strategy achieve larger market shares and profits compared to the situation 
where the P-strategy is adopted. TP also prefers the R-strategy to the P-strategy in order to 
achieve a higher number of visitors. Secondly, if all TOs or HAs synchronously choose the same 
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strategy, the P-strategy would be a better strategy for both sectors. Thirdly, when TOs or HAs can 
freely choose their strategies, there is a market equilibrium where the P-strategy and R-strategy 
could coexist. Finally, as far as individual sectors are concerned, one of the sectors, either the TO 
sector or the HA sector, is expected to adopt the P-strategy. In the context of entire supply chain, 
the condition in which the supply chain maximizes its welfare is also presented. 
Further research can be extended in two possible directions. First, the quantity competition 
between TOs and HAs is assumed. An alternative model would be to replace the quantity 
competition by a price competition where the enterprises choose equilibrium prices rather than 
quantities. Comparative analysis could yield different and more interesting results. Second, 
strategy choices could be investigated in a more realistic market structure. For example, in reality, 
some sectors such as the TO sector and HA sector tend to dominate the markets and some players 
within each sector have significant influences as market leaders, while other sectors such as 
restaurants and retail shops depend somewhat on the leading sectors and small enterprises within 
a sector have to operate on the market as followers. Therefore, it would be interesting to examine 
the different impacts of strategy choices between industry leaders and followers in the TSCs.  
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